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The genesis of the economic crises was the emergence of what has been termed as 
shadow banking system in United States where each lending institution was treating each 
other‟s debt as asset in the capital base for lending resulting eventually in the circular 
credit interdependence (Bhaduri 2009). The absence of effective regulations in US 
economic governance could therefore be held responsible for current financial crises. In 
the era of financial globalization other economies could not have remained insulated. The 
crises spread to other economies closely integrated with it. Indian economy which was 
considered to be insulated because of well regulated financial sector also found itself 
inflicted by the global situation. Its difficulties arose on account of the shrinkage of 
demand for its export and slackening of capital inflows from these economies on which 
India‟s economic growth, during last one and a half decade, came to be critically 
dependent.   
  The crises, which by August-September 2008 assumed global coverage, demanded 
fiscal solution as the task was not only to inject extra liquidity into the economy but also 
to generate demand for it. Therefore most of the countries responded to the crises by 
offering stimulus packages. When it comes to such demand management in a federal 
country the dynamics of fiscal federalism inevitably comes under scrutiny. Federalism is 
the institutionalized arrangement that confers „inextinguishable rights‟ on sub-national 
governments (Breton, 2000).  Federalism is supposed to bring about political and fiscal 
decentralization to realize administrative and economic efficiency in the delivery of 
public goods. Optimal allocation of powers and responsibilities amongst governments at 
various levels in a federation is a significant and ever relevant issue. As political realities 
of a country are subject to a continuous change its financial system should be capable 
enough to adjust itself to the changing political scenario but without seriously 
compromising its capabilities to face economic challenges. So are the institutions that 
come up with the evolution of a federation. Federal relations undergo a change in 
response to changing political and economic scenario but the basic structure of federation 
normally remains unaltered. It is the system of finance especially the institutions of 
federal transfers that make a federation resilient to various challenges (both economic and 
political) and thus help federation keeps going. 
 This paper attempts to evaluate the working of fiscal federalism in India and its 
response and its capabilities to withstand crises and whether there could have been more 
efficient way of tackling the crises. A brief description of India‟s federal financial system 
and its working is necessary for the task in hand. 
System of Federal Finance in India   
 India is a federal country with the constitutional assignments of legislative and 
fiscal jurisdictions to Central, States and local governments. The latter was granted 
Constitutional status only in 1993 through 73
rd
 and 74
th
 amendments to Indian 
Constitution and is yet to be properly integrated with the federation as it seriously lacks 
the financial and administrative autonomy. So not only these bodies continue to remain 
dependent on devolutions from State governments (in certain cases Centre provides the 
funds to them bypassing State government) they continued to remain deprived of the 
fiscal instruments. Therefore effective federalism in India consists of two layers of 
government at the Centre and at States‟ level. However the local governments do have 
serious financial implications for the States‟ finances as after coming into effect of the 
above mentioned Constitutional amendments it became obligatory on the States to 
devolve funds to these local bodies. It was further formalized by the creation of the 
„Finance Commission‟ in every State to recommend the quantum of grants to be provided 
from State governments to the rural and urban local bodies.      
 
 
Asymmetric Federalism  
In terms of the constitutional assignments of legislative and fiscal powers India‟s 
is an asymmetric federalism with Centre enjoying greater amount of control over revenue 
resources while States are required to discharge larger responsibilities of providing public 
and merit goods besides providing various economic services. It is States that are 
responsible for the greater part of expenditure in the areas critical for accelerating growth 
and mitigating poverty such as irrigation works, roads, education, health and rural 
development. Against such responsibilities revenue sources assigned to them are meager 
and, barring one item i.e. tax on sales of goods, less elastic. To make up for the 
inadequacy of revenue the Constitution provided for the fiscal devolutions in the form of 
revenue sharing with Central government (Articles 270 and 272) and Grants-in-aid of the 
States‟ revenue (Article 275). The latter to be paid out of the „Consolidated Fund‟ of 
India to the States that are in need even after the devolution Under Articles 270 and 272. 
Such devolutions constitute significant part of States‟ revenue receipts. 
Monetary matters are under the jurisdiction of Central government, so it has 
certain amount of control over monetary policy. Fiscal measures whether of Centre or 
States are electorally sensitive and are often dictated by political expediency ignoring the 
economic reasoning. In this respect Centre is in an advantageous position it can push the 
monetary policy to neutralize the effects of fiscal profligacy if committed for reason of 
political expediency.  
Finance Commission 
Article 280 of the Indian Constitution provides for the Finance Commission (FC) 
to be appointed every five year to recommend the financial devolutions to States under 
various constitutional provisions mentioned above. The FC is required to assess the 
revenue and expenditure projections of both Central and States governments on some 
normative criteria and recommend (a) States‟ share from the sharable Central taxes and 
(b) the share of each State and union territory in such proceed besides any other item for 
which FC may be specifically asked in its terms of reference. Different FCs have 
invariably been asked, in their terms reference, to suggest measures for enhancing the 
fiscal capacity of States and reduce their debt burden. On account of Centre‟s financial 
commitments for planned economic development Centre‟s claim over larger revenue 
share from sharable taxes have been accepted by every FC.  
Planning Commission’s Transfers 
 States also do the economic planning to allocate resources to provide various 
economic services in a manner economically efficient and socially desirable. But their 
own revenue together with FC recommended devolutions are inadequate to find sufficient 
balance to finance their plans. In this regard they depend a great deal on financial 
resources provided to them by the Planning Commission (PC). The share of each State in 
the Plan assistance is worked out on the basis of „Revised Gadgil Formula‟ that assigns 
different weights to different parameters in distributing the plan assistance to the States. 
Such transfers are in the form of loans and grants in the ratio of 70:30 for the general 
category States and 10:90 for special category States.   
 Constitution of India (Article 282) provides that “The Union or the States may 
make any grants for any public purpose, notwithstanding that the purpose is not the one 
with respect to which Parliament or the Legislature of Stat, as the case may be, may make 
laws.” This „Miscellaneous Financial Provision‟ of the Constitution is used to make 
devolution, for the purpose of socio-economic planning, through the PC. The funds are 
transferred to the States by the PC through two routs; one, in the form of support to 
States‟ plan called „Central Plan Assistance‟ and two, via „Centrally Sponsored Schemes‟ 
of the Central Ministries known as specific purpose grants. 
 There are twofold difficulties for the States that are inherent in the system of PC 
transfers; one, States do not have the complete freedom in the finalization of their plans 
as they need the concurrence of PC for the disbursement of financial resources and two, 
the mechanism of such transfers facilitates automatic flow of loans to the States which 
they receive as a matter of their entitlements. Therefore States‟ indebtedness, in a sense, 
is institutionalized one. Central Ministries‟ transfers to their State counterparts are 
purpose specific and often conditional to the States providing the matching or the 
specified allocations.  Besides, the multiple channels of federal transfers leave a scope for 
jurisdictional conflict. So much so that often they seem to be working for cross purposes 
which is evident in the fact that while on the one hand most of the FCs have shown their 
concern for States‟ public debt and some like Eleventh and Twelfth FCs recommended 
effective relief measures
 
also, and
 
on the other, PC‟s transfers make them indebted as a 
matter of routine. 
Table-1 
Finance Commission Devolution and Other Current Transfers 
Period Share in Central 
Taxes 
Statutory 
Grants 
Finance 
Commission 
Transfers  
(2+3) 
Non-Statutory 
Grants 
Total 
 (4+5) 
Ninth FC (1990-
95) 
19,790 
(2.6) 
2,382 
(0.3) 
22,172 
(2.9) 
14,961 
(1.9) 
37,133 
(4.9) 
Tenth FC (1995-
00) 
37,608 
(2.4) 
2,935 
(0.2) 
40,542 
(2.6) 
21,332 
(1.4) 
61,874 
(4.0) 
Eleventh FC 
(2000-05) 
61,047 
(2.4) 
9,792 
(0.4) 
70,839 
(2.8) 
36,651 
(1.4) 
1,07,490 
(4.2) 
Twelfth FC 
(2005-08) 
1,15,315 
(2.8) 
20,620 
(0.5) 
1,35,935 
(3.3) 
78,389 
(1.9) 
2,14,323 
(5.2) 
 
Note: Figures in parentheses are as percentage to GDP. 
Source: Budget documents of the State Governments. 
  
 Table-1 provides an insight into the magnitude of transfers through both statutory 
source (FC) and the non-statutory one (PC) which reveal the degree of States‟ 
dependence on financial devolutions from Centre as they currently constitute more than 5 
percent of Gross Domestic Product and has never been less than 4 percent since 1990. 
Further, the share of non-statutory grant in such transfers is not the insignificant one.   
Thus the system can be characterized as the one that gives greater leverage to the 
Centre but at the same time provide considerable amount of flexibility to address various 
issues that come up from time to time related to Centre – States financial relations. It also 
appears that the scheme of fiscal federalism as provided in the Indian Constitution, 
adopted in 1950, ensured the assignment of fiscal function to Central and States‟ 
governments almost in the same manner that was to be suggested latter by Musgrave 
(1958). The economic logic advanced by the latter favors the „allocation function‟ to be 
with the States as they are closer to the people so they can judge people‟s preferences 
better. As far as „stabilization‟ and „distribution‟ functions are concerned it is the Central 
government which, in the absence of restriction on mobility of human and financial 
resources across States, can perform them efficiently as its jurisdiction extends to whole 
country. 
India’s Fiscal Federalism and Changing Political Realities 
But despite all of its asymmetry India‟s federal system has been working well to 
keep the federation going. The system could be characterized as the one with strong 
Centre (in terms of revenue resources) with system of federal transfers providing it the 
flexibility needed for the cohesion of the federation consisting of federating units that are 
vastly heterogeneous almost in every respect. India‟s fiscal federalism has demonstrated 
remarkable degree of adaptability as it has suitably adjusted itself to the changing 
political scenarios from time to time. But surprisingly, no significant change in the 
federal fiscal arrangements has ever been observed as a result of economic challenges 
which the country faced in plenty. At the same time any significant change in the political 
landscape had always influenced, in varying degree, the magnitude of federal transfers 
and some time fiscal arrangements also.  
A cursory glance at the table-2 would make one realize that successive FCs had 
recommended increased share (in comparison to the its predecessor) for the States from 
the divisible pool and some (Fourth and Seventh FCs) had raised it substantially before 
80
th
 amendment to the Indian Constitution in the year 2000 made all the Central taxes to 
be sharable and thus eliminating one of the major grievance of the States
1
. The share of 
the States from the Central taxes as recommended by the Eleventh FC to be 29.5 percent 
continued to be enhanced to 30.5 percent and 32 percent respectively by Twelfth and 
Thirteenth FCs. Especially significant is the latter‟s award for the reason discussed latter 
in paper.   
Table-2 
Recommended Shares in Divisible Taxes: First to Thirteenth Finance Commission 
Finance  
Commission 
Income Tax         Union Excise Duties (basic) 
States’ share          (per cent) States’ share (per cent) Number of articles covered 
First 55 40 3* 
Second 60 25 8** 
Third 66.7 20 35 
Fourth 75 20 All 
Fifth 75 20 All 
Sixth 80 20 All 
Seventh 85 40 All 
Eighth 85 45 All 
Ninth 85 45 All 
Tenth 77.5 47.5 All 
Eleventh 29.5 per cent of all taxes 
Twelfth 30.5 per cent of all taxes 
Thirteenth 32.0 per cent of all taxes 
* Items like tobacco, matches, and vegetable products. 
** Include all 3 items and sugar, tea, coffee, paper, vegetable non essential oils. 
Source: Finance Commission Reports. 
 
Beginning with the First FC when considerably small devolutions were 
recommended, every successive FC raised the States‟ share which could be viewed as 
rationalization only. The significant increases in their share were recommended by the 
Fourth and Seventh FCs which finalized their recommendations at a time when States 
                                                          
1
  The States‟ grievance was on account of the Centre‟s propensity to certain taxes that do not constitute the divisible 
pool but effectively reduce the collection of sharable taxes.   
became politically significant. The last major event in this direction was the 80
th
 
amendment to the Constitution which was enacted when States‟ political assertiveness 
was at their peak. The amendment came at a time when Eleventh FC was about to 
finalize its recommendations so it had to rework the whole thing again. Twelfth and 
Thirteenth FCs raising the States share further without any visible political development 
points to the fact that it could be either realization of the need for the Centre to concede 
ground to the States or – especially the Thirteenth FC‟s award – it could be an attempt 
(without explicit mentioning) to release greater amount of resources to be spent by State 
to tide over the economic slowdown resulting from the exogenous factors. 
Impact on the Economy of Global Financial Crises  
When financial crisis began to surface in U.S and Europe in August, 2007 it was 
believed India would remain largely unaffected because of the „strong fundamentals‟ of 
the economy and well-regulated banking system. But the deceleration in the growth rate 
of economy was very much in evidence in 2007-08 when it registered a growth of 9.2 
percent as compared 9.7 percent in 2006-07. This small deceleration is significant as it 
occurred despite significant acceleration in agricultural output. Further, in view of the 
economic growth sustained by the economy over the last many years despite agriculture‟s 
less than satisfactory performance the small deceleration discussed above is significant.  
 In order to understand the contagion of the global meltdown for Indian economy 
the genesis of the economic
 
boom in India that preceded the current downturn needs to be 
understood. Such boom was contributed a great deal by India‟s global integration in three 
ways;  one, increased dependence on
 
capital inflows especially of the short-term variety, 
two, greater reliance
 
on exports particularly of services, and three, the
 
role these played in 
domestic credit-induced
 
consumption and investment demand. The question whether 
economic slowdown observed in 2007-08 was on account of the global crises contagion 
or the domestic factors
2
 is not relevant (for this paper), what is significant here is that the 
                                                          
2
  Mihir Rakshit (2009) believes India began to slow down even before the emergence of the global crises. 
economy‟s growth in the last many years was contributed a great deal by external sector 
which generated sufficient aggregate demand. With the crises in external market Indian 
economy was bound to suffer.  
Foreign Capital Flows 
 The major part of the capital inflows consisted of foreign institutional 
investment (FII) which dried up as the crises deepened. The withdrawal of FII in 
substantial magnitude (table-3) caused, decline in Indian companies‟ access to foreign 
capital, reduced domestic liquidity and led to a downslide in the stock market. Rate of 
interest shot up compressing investment further and building inflationary pressure 
resulting ultimately in shrinkage of aggregate demand. 
Table-3 
Net Capital Flows 
                                                                                                                     US$ billion  
Items 
           April-March 2007-2008 
(PR) 
Jan-Mar 
                     2008-2009 (P) 
2007-2008 
(PR) 
2008-2009 
(P) 
Apr-
Jun 
Jul-
Sep. 
Oct-
Dec. 
Jan-
Mar 
FDI 15.4 17.5 8.5 9.0 4.9 0.4 3.2 
Inward FDI 34.2 35.0 14.2 11.9 8.8 6.3 8.0 
Outward FDI 18.8 17.5 5.7 2.9 3.9 5.9 4.8 
FIIs 20.3 -15.0 -4.1 -5.2 -1.4 -5.8 -2.6 
Net Capital 
Flow 
108.0 9.1 26.0 11.1 7.6 -4.3 -5.3 
 
P: Preliminary, PR: Partially Revised. 
Source: External Economy July 27, 2009, RBI Publication III   
 
 
 
 
Why Fiscal Policy? 
For long since the economic crises of 1930s, discretionary fiscal policy with a 
combination of increased public expenditure or the tax concessions was actively used for 
the purpose of macroeconomic corrections if the economy exhibited recessionary trend. 
However by the early 1980s, it lost favor on account of some of its long term fallouts. 
Consequently it revived the neo-classical wisdom which believes in the self equilibrating 
capabilities of the market. For the purpose of dealing with the downswings of the 
business cycle Monetary Policy began to be favored as it induces the desired change 
through the function of the market. Further, since multilateral financial agencies too were 
obsessed with neo-liberal market policies they bitterly opposed expansionary fiscal 
policies involving public debt on account of its distortions it produces in the economy. 
However expansionary fiscal policy has been justified in case of sustained and long term 
decline in aggregate demand (Feldstein, 2002). For the fast deteriorating economy fiscal 
stimulus are expected to arrest such downturn quicker than the monetary measures. 
With the outbreak of present crises fiscal policy swung back to contention again. 
The proper design of the fiscal policy, it is suggested, should have following properties; it 
should be „timely‟ given the urgency for the action, „properly‟ targeted for maximum 
impact and should be „temporary‟ so as not to breach the sustainability conditions for 
long.  
India’s fiscal Policy Stance  
 Among the public policy options Fiscal Policy occupies a prominent position in 
India. Though it has begun to gradually move away from the regime of social controls to 
the market economy but it did so in a cautious manner. In view of the large poor 
population it has to provide wide array of goods efficient provision of which cannot be 
ensured by the market (merit goods). Environmental issue also makes the government 
intervention inevitable as market does not exist for environmental goods. Therefore the 
tax and expenditure (that include subsidies) measures along with public debt continued to 
be the effective means for the socially desirable allocation of resources.  
Since the onset of economic reforms in 1991 India‟s fiscal policy has been 
consistent with the objective of reducing fiscal deficit with occasional deviation from the 
path for social sector spending as well as for the reason of political expediency. The 
experience of the decade preceding reforms, when fairly higher growth rate failed to 
reduce economy‟s dependence on public expenditure for „aggregate demand, made us 
obsessed with fiscal deficit as public debt reached to unsustainable level (Seshan 1987). 
Therefore managing fiscal deficit remained very high on any agenda of fiscal reforms. 
As there was little coordination between the fiscal actions of the Centre and States, 
despite former having initiated the reforms, fiscal deficit had reached, towards the close 
of the century, to a level comparable with the pre reform period. The problem became so 
prominent that Centre had to introduce, in 2000, „Fiscal Responsibility and Budget 
Management Bill‟ to its eventual enactment in 2003 albeit in a bit diluted form. In the 
meantime political conditions in the economy paved the way for the Eightieth 
Amendment to the Constitution making all the Central taxes sharable. 
Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism 
An interesting politico-economic scenario emerged in India in the current century. 
Centre, which hitherto enjoyed greater control over resources, became relatively weaker 
politically and its government became increasingly dependent for its existence on the 
support of the political parties whose core constituencies were their respective States. At 
the same time fiscal consolidation became absolute necessity. With Central taxes 
becoming sharable, States‟ fiscal imbalances were a great worry for the Centre as any of 
its reform measure would be critically dependent on States‟ fiscal health. In view of the 
abovementioned politico-economic scenario fiscal consolidation became a challenging 
task. But still the fiscal reform process went on resulting in States‟ transition from Sales 
tax to Value Added Tax (VAT) and the enactment of Fiscal Responsibility and Budget 
management (FRBM) Acts at the States‟ level.   
Correction of States‟ fiscal imbalances was indeed a challenging task, extremely 
important for Central finances too, but seemingly difficult for Centre to enforce 
discipline. The task was accomplished by Twelfth FC which came out with debt relief 
package consisting of (a) Debt Swap scheme whereby all of the States‟ high interest debts 
would be consolidated and swapped with that of low interest and (b) Debt write-off 
scheme. The (a) was conditional to the States‟ enactment of FRBM legislation that made 
it mandatory for them to bring down their fiscal deficit to 3 percent and revenue deficit to 
zero by 2008-09. To avail the benefits under (b) States were required to follow fiscal 
correction path proportional to which would be their entitlements to debt relief. Such 
measures though enabled them to attain considerable amount of fiscal correction but 
reduced the space for the fiscal maneuverability. Simultaneously it recommended for a 
halt on Planning Commission‟s loan transfers to States thereby, it is argued, the FC has 
transgressed its jurisdiction. Thus it can be argued that India‟s federal structure does have 
the properties to withstand political and economic challenges. 
India’s Federal Institutions and Response to the Current Crises   
As has been discussed earlier in the paper that by August 2008 crises assumed 
global dimensions affecting economies in all the corners of globe. By this time Indian 
economy started showing the signs of deceleration. This was in spite of the fact that 
massive public expenditure was incurred during 2008-09 on account of certain social 
security obligations like National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (2005) and the 
payment of part of arrears to the Central government employees following the acceptance 
the recommendations of Sixth Central Pay Commission. The finances of the Central and 
State Governments deteriorated considerably in 2008-09 as a result of global economic 
slowdown and fiscal stimulus measures consisted of indirect tax cuts and additional 
expenditure through three supplementary demands for grants undertaken by the Central 
Government to support growth. The fiscal implications of the same were tremendous and 
the fiscal consolidation that was achieved by 2007-08 was lost the very next year. But the 
net result of such fiscal expansion was that economy‟s growth momentum, though 
decelerated a bit, was still impressive if viewed in comparison to the other economies of 
the world. But such growth could be achieved through fiscal expansion (as in the 1980s). 
Extra spending by the Central government continued into 2008-09 as well. One single 
item of non regular public expenditure again was the disbursement of the remaining 40 
per cent of pay revision arrears of Government employees. But significant thing in this 
financial year as well as in the preceding one has been that it was not financed by the tax 
increase or subsidies rollback but through debt finance. It would not have been possible 
in the absence of crises for the government guided by fiscal conservatism. Thus the 
government could exploit domestic compulsions for fiscal expansion to its advantage.  
Another response to the crises was the Centre allowing State governments, in 
2008-09 and 2009-10, to spend beyond the FRBM stipulations temporarily restoring the 
fiscal space taken away from them. It was because of the fiscal correction measures 
undertaken by the States to fulfill the obligations under FRBM, and meet the 
requirements of the debt-write off that States could achieve considerable improvement in 
their finances up to 2007-08, reflected in the revenue surplus of States reaching 0.9 per 
cent of GDP and gross fiscal deficit (GFD) declining to 1.5 per cent of GDP in 2007-08. 
Such fiscal consolidation enabled the States for fiscal expansions as demanded by the 
current crises.  
Considering the combined share of the States in the in the aggregate spending of 
the economy (table-4) and their fiscal obligations towards the local government the States 
should have been provided a little more fiscal space while the just contrary had happened. 
The net result of such developments is that the States seem to be unwilling to concede the 
same space to the local governments (aspect not discussed in this paper). It also results in 
various social security measures especially the employment programs fail to create social 
and economic infrastructure and continued to remain perpetually dependent on budgetary 
support  
                                                        Table-4 
          Composition of Revenue Expenditures of State Governments (2000 to 2010) 
                                                                                                     (Per cent on GDP) 
Item 2000-05 2005-10 
Development Expenditure 7.3 7.2 
Social Services 4.4 4.4 
Economic Services 2.9 2.8 
Non-Development Expenditure 5.8 4.9 
Interest payments and Debt servicing 2.8 2.2 
Pensions 1.2 1.2 
Total Revenue Expenditure 13.3 12.4 
     Source: Reserve Bank of India, State Finances: A Study of Budgets of 2009-10 
 
  
The observation of table-4 suggests that in relation to GDP States‟ revenue 
expenditure was roughly the same or a little less as it was in the five year period 
preceding it. Such revenue expenditure would not have been possible had the 
States not been allowed to breach the fiscal limits they were subjected to as per the 
requirements of FRBM Acts, a concession that stands withdrawn as the states have 
now been asked to go back to the fiscal correction path by 2011-12. The 
significant thing in this context is scenario that States themselves are not 
determining their fiscal priorities.   
Conclusion 
The analyses of the fiscal federalism in India suggests that the constitutional as 
well as institutional framework of it is well crafted as it provides tremendous amount of 
flexibilities to adjust itself to political and economic challenges. The Centre somehow is 
holding on to the almost the same position which was accorded to it when the system was 
created. The need was and continues to be, in view of the vast diversity that prevails in 
the country, of a strong Centre although the political realities have considerably changed 
and States are in a better position to tough bargaining with the Centre. The institutions of 
federal transfers, especially the „Finance Commission‟ has the capabilities to keep the 
Centre as prominent as it was. India‟s federal fiscal system facilitated whatever was 
required to meet the challenges of the challenges of the current economic crises. Despite 
States having larger share in total expenditure they were utilized in limited manner. 
Major concessions fiscal concessions to maintain the aggregate demand came from 
Central government. The States could maintain their expenditure levels, though by fiscal 
profligacy, during the crises could be attributed to the fiscal correction they achieved in 
the last few years.  
For such fiscal correction the credit should go to the FC but without bringing in 
any structural change to enhance the fiscal capacity of States the correction is likely to be 
fragile.   Furthermore, the FRBM induced fiscal discipline has reduced the fiscal space to 
the States reducing their options to effectively intervene if the need be, as in the present 
case they could do only when Centre had allowed them to. Considering the assignments 
of responsibilities to the States they should have been devolved some more fiscal power 
as fiscal devolutions on which States are greatly dependent offer only revenue but keep 
them deprived of the fiscal instruments. 
Present crises proved once again that the basic design of India‟s federal structure 
that accorded dominance to Centre is capable of somehow maintaining – through its 
institutions – such dominance even under adverse political and economic circumstances.  
 
References 
1. Arvind Subramanian, John Williamson (2009): The World Crisis: Reforms to Prevent a 
Recurrence. Economic & Political Weekly, March 28, Vol.XLIV No.13. 
2. Bagchi, Amaresh (2001): Perspectives on Correcting Fiscal Imbalance in the Indian Economy. 
ICRA Bulletin, Money and Finance, Jan-June 2001. 
3. Bhaduri Amit (2009) Understanding the Financial Crises. Economic and Political Weekly March 
28 – April 3, Vol XLIV, No. 13. 
4. Blinder, Alan S. and Robert M. Solow (1973): “Does Fiscal Policy Matter”, Journal of Public 
Economics, 1973. 
5. Breton, Albert (2000) “Federalism and Decentralization: Ownership Rights and the Superiority 
of         Federalism”, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vol. 30. No. 2. 
6. Chakraborty, Pinaki (1998): “Growing Imbalances in Federal Fiscal Relationship”, Economic 
and Political Weekly, February 14, 1998. 
7. Elmendorf Douglas W. And Jason Furman (2008), “If, When, How: A Primer on Fiscal 
Stimulus”, The Hamilton Project, Strategy Paper, January.  
8. Feldstein Martin (2002), “The Role for Discretionary Fiscal Policy in a Low Interest Rate 
Environment”, NBER Working Paper 9203.  
9. Freedman C., M. Kumhof, D. Laxton and J. Lee (2009) “The Case for Global Fiscal Stimulus”, 
IMF Staff Position Note, March 6.  
10. Government of India RBI (2009): The External Economies III. 
11. International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2008), World Economic Outlook, September.  
12. Kumar Arun (2009): “Tackling the Current Crises” Economic & Political Weekly, March 28, 
2009. 
13. Mihir Rakshit (2009): India amidst the Global Crisis, Economic & Political Weekly, March 28, 
Vol. XLIV No.13. 
14. Musgrave RA (1959): The Theory of Public Finance. McGraw Hill, New York.  
15. Rao, M.Govinda and Tapas K. Sen (1996): “Fiscal Federalism in India- Theory and Practice”, 
Macmillan, Delhi. 
16. Ram Mohan TT (2009): The Impact of the Crisis on the Indian Economy. Economic & Political 
Weekly, March 28, Vol.XLIV No.13. 
17. Seshan A (1987): The Burden of Domestic Public Debt in India. RBI Occasional Papers, June. 
18. Taylor John B. (2000), “Reassessing Discretionary Fiscal Policy”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, American Economic Association, Vol. 14(3). 
